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Abstract 
Employing the one-step stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach, this paper examines bank 
efficiency in China, paying special attention to the ownership, selection effect and dynamic 
effects of governance changes on bank performance. Bank efficiency has improved over the 
data period 1995-2008. The estimated average cost and profit efficiencies are 74% and 63% 
respectively. Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) and City Commercial Banks (CCBs) 
outperform State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs). The results suggest a strong selection 
effect for foreign investors. Foreign ownership participation has a negative effect on profit 
efficiency in the long-term while initial public offerings (IPOs) improve bank profitability in 
the short-term.  The research findings have important implications on future bank reforms in 
China in the aftermath of the current financial crisis. 
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China achieved an annual GDP growth of over nine per cent during the past 30 years, becoming the third 
largest economy in the world next to the USA and Japan. Along with economic reforms, China’s banking 
system has undoubtedly contributed to this miracle and has become more influential in world financial 
markets. The banking system has been subject to piecemeal but well-planned reforms since the 1980s 
with more radical banking reform triggered by China’s WTO entry in 2001. By ‘touching stones to cross 
the river’, banking reform has achieved important results. By 2009, three Chinese banks, namely 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank Corporation (CCBC), and 
Bank of China (BOC), were rated as the world’s three largest banks in terms of market capitalization. 
 
This study employs a one-step SFA model to estimate cost and profit efficiency for 47 commercial banks 
over the period 1995—2008 to evaluate bank performance and investigate the impacts of reform 
strategies on bank performance. It uses market average input prices when estimating cost and profit 
efficiency, unlike most efficiency studies that use endogenously determined bank specific input prices, 
which is in contradiction with the assumption of cost and profit functions that firms face exogenous input 
prices in competitive markets. Estimated cost efficiency and profit efficiency average at 74% and 63%, 
respectively, and both have improved over data period. State-owned banks are the most cost efficient 
banks, however, it is argued that higher level of non-performing loans (NPLs) have inflated their estimated 
cost efficiency. Profit efficiency appears to be a better performance measure, under which SOCBs 
become the least profitable banks and CCBs turn out as the most efficient ones. The selection effect 
indicators suggest that more profitable banks have been selected for IPOs.  In the long-term, both foreign 
ownership and IPOs tend to improve cost efficiency but worsen profit efficiency. Although results show the 
effect of foreign ownership and IPO strategies are not as effective as expected, they are essential 
successful steps in China’s long match to modernize its banking system. The subsequent reform should 
ensure well established corporate governance structure functioning via fundamental change in bank 





China achieved an annual GDP growth of over nine per cent during the past 30 years, 
becoming the third largest economy in the world next to the USA and Japan. Along with 
economic reforms, China’s banking system has undoubtedly contributed to this miracle. 
As China becomes more integrated with the world, its banking system has become more 
influential in world financial markets. By 2009, three Chinese banks, namely Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank Corporation (CCBC), 
and Bank of China (BOC), were rated as the world’s three largest banks in terms of 
market capitalization. The subject is of interest in terms of the role of these banks in 
providing a degree of financial stability to the world system in the recent financial crisis 
and its continuing aftermath. 
 
The banking system has been subject to piecemeal but well-planned reforms since the 
1980s to better serve economic development and maintain social stability. More radical 
banking reform was triggered by China’s WTO entry in 2001 to ensure that Chinese 
banks are viable in an open financial market since 2007. By ‘touching stones to cross 
the river’, banking reform has achieved important results. It is of great interest to 
empirically examine bank performance and to investigate the impacts of reform 
strategies, thereby providing policy makers with valuable information for future reform 
in the aftermath of the current financial crisis. Despite a wealth of bank efficiency 
literature, there are only a handful of studies investigating bank efficiency in China. 
None of them simultaneously examines the ownership effect, selection effect and the 
dynamic effect of governance changes on bank performance. This paper attempts to 
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 bridge the gap and contribute to existing literature in the context of developing countries 
and bank privatization.  
 
Employing a one-step SFA model, this paper estimates cost and profit efficiency for 47 
commercial banks over the period 1995—2008. This is by far the largest dataset on the 
Chinese banking industry. Most efficiency studies use endogenously determined bank 
specific input prices by dividing total factor expenses by the total units of factors 
employed, which is in contradiction with the assumption of cost and profit functions 
where firms face exogenous input prices in competitive markets (Mountain and Thomas, 
1999). In fact, in literature only a few studies have addressed this issue
1. This study uses 
market average input prices to resolve this problem.  Estimated cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency average at 74% and 63% respectively. Both cost and profit efficiencies 
have improved over data period. In a cost efficiency model, SOCBs are the most 
efficient banks while Foreign Banks (FBs) are the most inefficient ones. It is found that 
non-performing loans (NPLs) have inflationary effect on cost efficiency for banks with 
high level of NPLs. This finding suggests that profit efficiency is a better performance 
measure. In the profit efficiency model, SOCBs become the least profitable banks and 
CCBs become the most efficient ones. The selection effect is found for IPOs in the 
profit efficiency model, that is, more profitable banks have been selected for IPOs.  But 
adverse selection effect is found for both foreign ownership participation and IPOs in 
the cost efficiency model. In the long-term, both foreign ownership and IPOs tend to 
improve cost efficiency but worsen profit efficiency.  
 
                                                 
1 Patti and Hardy (2005), Berger and Mester (2003), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), Bos and Kool (2006) 
and Koetter (2005). 
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 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews literature on bank 
efficiency in developing and transition countries. Section 3 introduces the Chinese 
banking system and banking reform. Section 4 outlines research methods. Section 5 
analyzes empirical results and section 6 concludes.   
 
2. BANK EFFICIENCY IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
Despite voluminous literature on bank efficiency, most studies have been undertaken in 
the US and in European countries. In the last two decades, there has been a rapid 
development of empirical research in developing and transition economies where 
market-oriented banking reform has been either completed or underway. Before reform 
their banking systems shared many commonalities. For instance, banks were 
functionally segmented by economic sectors; they showed a lack of management skills 
and credit analysis systems; the banking systems were commonly dominated by state-
ownership with poor asset quality and weak oversight institutions (Claessens 1998).  
 
Bank reform has been highlighted on the policy agenda in most transition economies 
and developing countries. The primary objective is to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation and to strengthen the financial foundation of the economy. Although reform 
strategies vary across countries, reform measures generally include lowering entry 
barrier, privatization, enhancing the supervisory framework, liberalizing interest rates, 
and removing credit controls. As a result, efficiency studies attempt to capture the effect 
of deregulation, financial liberalization, foreign bank entry, and ownership change.  
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 Ownership has been an important issue. The primary concern is how to find the optimal 
ownership and management structure which can better tackles the principal-agent 
problem (Spong et al. 1995).  State ownership has been prevalent in transition and 
developing countries. The argument for state ownership is that governments are able to 
channel funds to sectors and projects with low financial but high social returns. On the 
other hand, state ownership is commonly blamed for poor performance due to various 
reasons. State ownership theoretically means all citizens are co-owners who in practice 
have no power and no incentive to influence and monitor the management of state banks.  
This free-rider problem leaves governments the only effective representative agent 
(Huibers 2005). Governments, however, have multiple (often conflicting) goals other 
than pure profit maximization. Another reason is the lack of market discipline on 
inefficient SOCBs and inadequate means of punishing wrong-doing bank managers. 
The management of private banks is under pressure to improve bank efficiency as 
inefficient management would be replaced and banks may be bankrupt when facing 
financial distress.  
 
Empirical research generally shows a negative association between bank efficiency and 
state ownership. In transition economies, state-owned banks are found to be 
significantly less efficient than their private counterparties (Bonin et al. 2005a; Fries 
and Taci 2005; and Yao et al. 2007). There are some exceptional studies. For example, 
Chen (2005) found that state banks outperformed other types of banks. 
 
As to foreign banks, a home field advantage hypothesis argues that domestic institutions 
are generally more efficient than foreign-owned institutions due to organizational 
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 diseconomies to operate and monitor from a distance and limited access to soft 
qualitative information. In contrast, a global advantage hypothesis argues that foreign 
institutions can be more efficient because of superior managerial skills and high quality 
human capital inherited from foreign owners (Berger et al. 2000).  
 
A tendency has been found that the home field advantage hypothesis holds in developed 
countries while the global advantage hypothesis holds in developing countries 
(Claessens  et al., 2001). In developed countries, it is evident that the home field 
advantage hypothesis holds (Berger et al., 2000; De Yong and Nolle, 1996; Sathye’s, 
2001; Chang et al., 1998; and Peek et al., 1999). In developing and transition economies, 
the empirical results are less conclusive. A limited form of global advantage hypothesis 
is supported by Bonin et al. (2005b) and Kraft et al. (2006) while Rao (2005) and Jiang 
et al. (2009) find the home field advantage hypothesis holds in United Arab Emirates 
and China, respectively.  
 
Privatization has been a major strategy to improve bank performance by constructing 
good governance and management structure. Empirical research has shown clear 
performance improvements after privatization in developing countries and transition 
economies (Boubakri et al. 2005; Berger et al. 2005 and Williams and Nguyen 2005). 
Foreign ownership participation in domestic banks and bank IPOs are two common 
privatization methods. Foreign ownership participation is expected to bring in advanced 
technology, modern banking techniques and superior managerial skills. Empirical 
literature has found improved performance after foreign investment (Fries and Taci 
2005 and Bonin et al. 2005b). IPOs are expected to incorporate the disciplining role of 
5 
 the capital markets on banks and listed banks are found to be more efficient than 
unlisted ones (Berger and Mester 1997).  
 
Only in recent years the study of bank efficiency in China has attracted serious attention. 
Existing studies consistently report improved efficiency after more than two decades of 
reforms. Most studies (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2005; Berger et al., 2009; Yao, et al., 
2007; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; and Jiang et al. 2009) suggest that JSCBs are more 
efficient than SOCBs with one exception of Chen et al. (2005) that find SOCBs 
outperform JSCBs. This paper distinguishes itself from existing studies by using market 
average input prices to estimate cost and profit efficiency and jointly examining 
ownership effect, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes on bank 
efficiency.  
 
3. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM AND ITS REFORM 
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese banking system has entered into a reforming period, 
aiming at creating a multi-ownership, competitive and market-oriented banking system. 
This period can be sub-divided into four stages. The first stage was an initial 
institutional restructuring period during 1979-84, beginning with the creation of a two-
tier banking system. The People’s Bank of China became the central bank with the main 
objectives of maintaining price stability, supervising financial institutions, conducting 
clearance, and issuing bank notes. The commercial banking operations were taken over 
by four specialized state-owned banks, known as the “Big Four”. The Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC) undertook rural banking businesses. ICBC (established in 1984) 
focused on commercial banking activities in urban areas. CCBC dealt with fixed assets 
investment of the government and urban large construction projects while the BOC 
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 conducted foreign currency transactions. Each bank had its own economic sector to 
serve and there was no competition among them. 
 
The subsequent reform was to deepen institutional restructuring during 1984-94, 
focusing on deregulations to create a competitive banking system. Since the early 1980s, 
foreign banks and domestic joint-stock banks were allowed to enter the market. Most 
nationwide or regional JSCBs were launched with shareholding ownership structures—
an institutional breakthrough in banking industry. Operational restrictions on four 
specialized state banks were removed. These banks were allowed to enlarge their 
business scope and to compete with one another and JSCBs and they were expected to 
be profit-driven institutions. However, the “Big Four” still played a strong role in 
promoting economic growth and maintaining stability.  Commercial banking practices 
and skills were hardly developed.  
 
The third stage of banking reform was the commercialization of banks during 1994-
2003. The year 1995 marked the beginning of bank commercialization when the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks was enacted. The “Big Four” 
were legally defined as state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and they were 
expected to be profit-driven and operationally independent. Their policy lending 
functions were taken away by the three newly established policy banks
2. However, 
these policy banks lacked branch network and capital as well as serving and lending 
capacity. They were unable to meet the needs of policy lending previously fulfilled by 
the “Big Four”.  Central and local governments frequently intervened in the operations 
                                                 
2  Namely the China Development Bank, the Import-Export Bank of China, and the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China 
7 
 of SOCBs resulting in huge NPLs in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy 
experienced overheating and the transitional reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
was deepened in the 1990s. NPLs in SOCBs grew even faster while bank capital 
adequacy ratios declined steadily. By 1999, SOCBs became financially insolvent and 
the banking system became weak and vulnerable. The total amount of NPLs in SOCBs 
was estimated at RMB 3.3 trillion (Chinese Currency) under a four-category loan 
classification system, accounting for 41 per cent of GDP for the year. To treat the ailing 
banking system, the central government launched the first round of SOCBs bailouts in 
1998-99. Fresh capital of RMB 270 billion was injected into SOCBs in 1998 through 
bonds issues and NPLs of RMB 1.4 trillion were transferred to four newly-created asset 
management companies. SOCBs’ balance sheets were cleaned up, while the reform had 
not addressed the deep-rooted issues of incentive and efficiency.  
 
In 2003, the central government initiated radical banking reforms to modernize the 
banking system in response to the challenges brought about by China WTO entry in 
2001 that the Chinese government committed to fully opening up the banking sector by 
the end of 2006. Using the state’s massive foreign exchange reserves, the government 
injected US$ 22.5 billion into BOC and CCBC respectively in 2003 and US$ 15 billion 
into ICBC in 2005. NPLs were stripped off from them, amounting to RMB 475 billion 
in 2004 and RMB 705 billion in 2005. After financial restructuring, these SOCBs were 
partially privatised by attracting foreign investors and undergoing IPOs. Foreign 
investors reacted positively with a surge in 2004 and a peak in 2005. For example, Bank 
of America acquired a nine per cent stake in CCBC and Goldman Sachs, Allianz and 
American Express acquired a 10 per cent stake in ICBC. The Royal Bank of Scotland 
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 together with Merrill Lynch and Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing bought a 10 per cent 
stake in BOC
3. Subsequently, these SOCBs successfully made their IPOs on the 
Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. The market reaction was highly positive 
from the second half of 2006. By 2009, ICBC, BOC and CCBC became the world top 
three banks by market capitalization. Successful IPOs and their subsequent 
extraordinary performance on the stock markets was a cornerstone for the overall 
success of China’s further bank reform. The reform of the last big SOCB—ABC is 
underway and the government announced to inject $30 billion to ABC in early 2009 
(sourced from various press releases). 
 
Along with institutional and financial restructuring, a series of comprehensive and 
concrete reforms were implemented to liberalize the financial market and strengthen a 
prudent regulatory and supervisory framework. Actions included the removal of credit 
quotas in 1998, the introduction of capital adequacy requirements, the adoption of an 
internationally accepted five-category loan classification system, NPLs reduction and 
control, and so forth. Banking reform has achieved staged progress. By 2009, a multi-
layered banking system has taken shape, comprising of a central bank of the PBC, a 
regulatory and supervisory body of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, four 
partially privatized SOCBs, 13 JSCBs, 112 CCBs, FBs, along with a vast number of 
other small financial institutions. 
 
                                                 
3 See Berger et al. (2009) for more details  
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 4. METHODOLOGIES, MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA  
The preferred estimation technique is SFA, developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt 
(1977). SFA pre-specifies a functional form and decomposes error terms into a random 
error ( ) and inefficiency ( ). It assumes that inefficiencies follow an asymmetrical 
half-normal distribution and random errors follow a symmetric standard normal 
distribution. Actually, the SFA is criticized for its pre-specified functional form and 
distributional assumptions. However, because of the separation between random errors 
and inefficiencies, the SFA is more appropriate over the non-parametric method in 
efficiency studies in transition and developing countries where problems of 
measurement errors and uncertain economic environments are more likely to prevail 
(Fries and Taci 2005).  
i v i u
 
A two-step procedure is commonly employed to estimate a cost and/or profit frontier to 
derive inefficiencies in the first step and to regress the estimated inefficiencies against a 
set of possible determinants in the second step. This two-step procedure suffers from 
serious econometric problems. Inefficiencies are assumed to be identically distributed in 
the first step but they are assumed to have a functional relationship with a set of 
variables in the second stage (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). An alternative one-step 
estimation procedure overcomes these problems. This paper adopts a one-step model 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). It is assumed that non-negative cost 
inefficiencies are a function of firm-specific variables and they are independently 
distributed as truncations of normal distributions with constant variance but with means 
that are a linear function of observable variables.  
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 A generalized Battese and Coelli (1995) cost model is shown by three equations. 
Equation (1) shows the cost frontier. 
it it it t it u v x t y ln ln ln 0 + + + + = β β β  ,   i=1, …, N; t=1,…,T,                    (1) 
where i and t denote firm and time;   is the logarithm of the cost of production of 
the i-th firm;   is a k×1 vector of the logarithm of input prices and output of the i-th 
firm;   a random variable assumed to be iid. N (0, ) and independent of  ;   are 
non-negative cost inefficiency, which are assumed to be independently distributed as 
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u σ β  is a vector of unknown parameters 
to be estimated. 
 
Equation (2) shows the inefficiency effects model  
it it t it W z t m + + + = δ δ δ0                                  (2) 
where    is a vector of explanatory variables associated with cost inefficiency of 
production over time;  is a random variable defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance  ; 
it z
it W
2 σ δ  is a vector of unknown coefficients to 
be estimated. 
 
Equation (3) defines cost efficiency for the i-th bank at the t-th time. 
) exp( ) exp( it it it it W z U CE + = = δ                                                                       (3) 
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where TC is the total costs of a bank in a given year;    are  outputs;  are input 
prices;  is fixed netputs; T is a time trend;   are identical and independently 
distributed random errors, which are independent of  ;   are  non-negative 
inefficiencies;  are adjusted values of logged outputs so that they fall within the 
interval 
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4 and  b and a, , , , , , , , , , η σ κ ϖ τ φ ψ β α are parameters to be 
estimated.  
 
The standard restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by normalizing 
the costs (profits) and input prices by one arbitrarily chosen input price--the price of 
fund. Total costs, profits, output variables and netputs are normalized by total assets to 
control for scale biases and heteroskedasticity. To derive profit efficiency, an alternative 
profit frontier is estimated by assuming that banks can exercise a degree of market 
                                                 
4  are rescaled so that each  term falls into the interval [0,2π]. Following Berger and Mester (1997), each 
end of the interval [0,2π] are cut off by 10% so that  to span the interval of 
) / ln( 2 z Yi n x
n x ] 2 9 . 0 , 2 1 . 0 [ π π × ×  for reducing 
approximation problems near the endpoints. According to Berger and Mester (1997), the rescaling formula is 
) / ln( 2 z Yi i i × + 2 . 0 a i × − μ μ where [a, b] is the range of    over the entire 11-year time interval, 
and
) / ln( 2 z Yi
) i a /( ) 2 1 . 0 2 9 i b . 0 ( i − × − × = π π μ . 
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 power in setting output prices (Berger and Mester 1997). The specification of 
alternative profit frontier is identical to the cost frontier except the dependant variable of 
total costs is replaced with profit and the inefficiency term becomes it u ln − .  
 
The empirical inefficiency effect model is shown in Equation (5). 
it it a
a





0                             (5)                                       
where t is a time trend;  is a vector of governance effect indicators; GDP is a proxy 
of macroeconomic environment.  
it CG
 
Employing a modified version of the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley 
1977), this paper defines three outputs--total loans, other earning assets and deposits; 
two inputs--cost of fund and cost of labour; and one netput--equity. Table 1 provides the 
summary statistics. Data are collected from BankScope complemented by the Almanac 
of China’s Finance and Banking (1986-2008) and the China Statistical Yearbook (1995-
2008). This paper focuses on commercial banks only and classifies banks into four types: 
SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs
5  and FBs. The sample of 481 observations covers major 
commercial banks in China.  
 
Theoretically, the price of labour and the price of physical capital should be measured 
separately. Due to the lack of separate data on labour (i.e. personnel expenses), the price 
of labour and physical capital is defined as the ratio of non-interest expenses to total 
                                                 
5 CCBs have been constructed as joint-stock commercial banks, but they are restricted to operate within 
their municipalities’ localities and subject to certain local government intervention. Their management are 
also very different from that of JSCBs. Therefore, CCBs are separated from JSCBs to gauge the effect of 
different governance structure on bank performance 
13 
 assets as in Hasan and Marton (2003). Labour and physical capital markets are defined 
by bank types. Market average prices of labour and physical capital are the un-weighted 
average of the prices the other banks belonging to the same bank type excluding the 
banks’ own price (Koetter, 2005). The price of funds is defined as the ratio of total 
interest expenses to total interest bearing funds. Two fund markets are identified. One is 
a national fund market for domestic banks as the interest rate structure is set by the 
central bank and commercial banks have been strictly restricted in setting interest rates 
on deposits and borrowings. Another fund market is for foreign banks as they were not 
allowed to collect deposits from domestic public before 2007 and therefore their 
funding sources are different from those of domestic banks. The market average price of 
fund is computed as the un-weighted average of the prices the other banks excluding the 
banks’ own price.  
 
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics   
Mean SD  Medium  Minimum  Maximum 
Total costs  19.777 62.103 1.456 0.007 684.391
Total profit  4.858 13.651 0.830 0.001 125.251
Gross Loans  285.611 646.375 20.125 0.058 3475.165
Other Earning Assets  204.866 514.318 18.414 0.064 3859.252
Total Deposits  403.244 971.905 29.064 0.109 6250.627
Equity 25.173 64.166 3.422 0.001 463.282
Market price of fund  0.027 0.021 0.020 0.009 0.180
Market price of labour  0.011 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.023
Note: all variables in RMB billion except for input prices. All variables at 1995 price level.  
 
The inefficiency effect model includes 11 governance effect indicators defined in Table 
2. The first four are ownership indicators -- CCB, JSCB, SOCB, and FBs. For all periods, 
these dummy variables equal one for such a bank and zero for all other banks. The 
variable of Listed Bank is used to explore the relationship between the listing status of 
14 




Table 2 Inefficiency effect indicators 
 
Ownership Effect Indicators  
CCBs  Equals 1 for CCBs and 0 otherwise.  
JSCBs  Equals 1 for JSCBs and 0 otherwise. 
SOCBs  Equals 1 for SOCBs and 0 otherwise. 
FBs  Equals 1 for FBs and 0 otherwise.  
Listed Banks  Equals 1 for listed banks and 0 otherwise.   
Selection Effect Indicators 
Selected for foreign acquisition  Equals 1 for banks underwent foreign acquisition and 0 
otherwise. 
Selected for IPO  Equals 1 for banks underwent IPO and 0 otherwise.   
Dynamic Effect Indicators 
Underwent foreign acquisition --ST   Equals 1 after foreign acquisition, 0 before acquisition 
and all other banks  
Underwent IPO--ST  Equals 1 after IPO, 0 before IPO and all other banks  
Underwent  foreign  acquisition  --LT  Number of years since foreign acquisition, 0 before 
acquisition and all other banks  
Underwent IPO--LT  Number of years since IPO, 0 before IPO and all other 
banks  
Note: the first indicator—CCBs is excluded from the estimation for comparison purposes. 
 
Two selection effect indicators—Selected for Foreign Acquisition and Selected for 
IPOs—are designed to see whether better performing banks are selected for governance 
changes. Dummies equal one for such a bank for all periods and zero otherwise. 
Dynamic governance indicators are defined to examine the effects of governance 
changes by comparing bank performance before governance changes with their 
subsequent performance after changes. Two short-term dynamic indicators—Underwent 
                                                 
6 Selection effect has taken account of the effect of IPOs up to 2009. 
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 Foreign Acquisition (ST) and Underwent IPO (ST)--measure the timing following 
governance changes. The dummies equal zero prior to governance change and one after 
the changes. Two long-term dynamic indicators--Underwent Foreign Acquisition--LT 
and Underwent IPO—LT--measure the number of years following a governance changes. 
The dummies equal zero prior to governance change for all banks and one starting from 
the change. The inefficiency effect model also includes a time trend variable and GDP 
growth as a proxy of macroeconomic condition. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Estimation results of the cost and alternative profit functions are reported in Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 3.  
Table 3 Estimation of cost and alternative profit frontiers using market average prices 
 
Panel A: Cost frontier   
Gamma (
2 2 2
u v u σ σ σ γ + ≡ )  0.94*** 
Sigma-squared ( ) 
2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + ≡ 0.44*** 
Log likelihood function   -86 
LR test of one-sided error  83 
Mean cost efficiency  0.74 
Panel B: Alternative profit frontier   
Gamma (
2 2 2
u v u σ σ σ γ + ≡ )  0.89*** 
Sigma-squared ( ) 
2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + ≡ 0.64*** 
Log likelihood function  -237 
LR test of one-sided error  229 
Mean profit efficiency  0.63 
Notes: ‘***’ signifies significance at 1 % levels 
 
Estimated γ is 0.94 and 0.89 in the cost and profit frontiers respectively, indicating a 
large part of the total composite error term attributable to inefficiency. LR test are 83 
and 229, confirming the existence of a one-sided error within the composite error term. 
16 
 The mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency are 74 per cent and 63 per cent, 
respectively. The results suggest that banks spend 26 per cent more than the minimum 
possible cost while earning 37 per cent less profit than the maximum possible profit of a 
best practiced bank using the same bundle of inputs under the same conditions. 
 
Figure 1 plots mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency by year. Cost efficiency 
increase by about 17 percentage points from 60 per cent in 1995 to 77 per cent in 1998. 
While SOCBs had made efforts to reduce costs by closing branches and dismissing 
labour, the main reason for the improvement is believed to be the significant cut in 
interest rates. For example, the interest rate on one-year deposits dropped by two-thirds 
from 10.98 per cent in 1995 to 3.78 per cent in 1998, reducing interest costs on deposits.  
 
The cost efficiency level remained stable thereafter until an increase in 2008. Profit 
efficiency was table at a low level of 50 per cent, reflecting poor quality of assets. 
Thereafter, profit efficiency experienced a steady increase from 50 per cent in 2000 to 
85 per cent in 2007.  The turnaround in 2000 was a direct consequence of the NPLs off-
loading from SOCBs. Subsequent improvement was attributable to improved bank 
management and operational skills as well as further off-loading of NPLs from SOCBs 
in 2003 and 2005. In 2008 cost efficiency increased while profit efficiency declining, 
perhaps reflecting that profit efficiency is more sensitive to the shock of global financial 
crisis starting in 2007.   
 






Results from the inefficiency effects model (reported in Table 4) are of particular 
interest as they offer insights into the ongoing banking reform.  
 
Table 4 Results of the inefficiency effect model 
 
   Cost efficiency  Profit efficiency 
Ownership effect  indicators 
FBs ( 1 δ )   0.69***  -0.04 
JSCBs ( 2 δ )   -0.38**  1.20*** 
SOCBs ( 3 δ )   -0.77***  3.11*** 
Listed banks ( 4 δ )   -1.76***   -0.31 
Selection effect indicators 
Selected for foreign acquisition ( 5 δ )   0.35**  -0.77** 
Selected for IPO ( 6 δ )   1.34**  0.01 
Dynamic effect indicators 
Underwent foreign acquisition-ST ( 7 δ )   -0.09   0.20 
Underwent foreign acquisition-LT ( 8 δ )   -0.15** 0.21*** 
Underwent IPO-ST ( 9 δ )   0.44  -1.01* 
Underwent IPO-LT ( 10 δ )   -0.28**   0.13 
 t  ( 11 δ )   -0.12***   -0.27*** 
GDP ( 12 δ )   1.57***  -2.6*** 
Notes: a. FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-owned commercial 
bank, IPO = initial public offering; b. *, **, *** signifies significance level at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 
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 1 per cent respectively; c. Negative sign of the estimated coefficient indicates that the particular variable 
has a positive effect on cost or profit efficiency and vice versa. 
 
Ownership effect indicators examine the performance of banks with different ownership. 
In cost efficiency model (shown in Figure 2), the coefficient on FBs ( 1 δ ) is positive and  
significant but the coefficients on JSCBs ( 2 δ ) and SOCBs ( 3 δ ) are all negative and 
significant, suggesting that FBs are less efficient than domestic banks. The results 
provide evidence for the home field advantage hypothesis. SOCBs are the most efficient 
banks at mean of 82 per cent followed by JSCBs at mean of 79 per cent. In the profit 
efficiency model (Figure 3), a very different picture emerges.  CCBs
7 are the most 
profitable banks at mean efficiency of 77 per cent. FBs outperform major domestic 
banks—JSCBs and SOCBs, providing weak evidence for the global advantage 
hypothesis.  
 
The average profit efficiency of SOCBs ( 3 δ ) is estimated as 36 per cent, substantially 
below the industrial average by 27 percentage points and below the best performers 
(CCBs) by 41 percentage points.  SOCBs operated at a rather low efficiency level of 
about 10 per cent for the first four years and from 1999 their profit efficiency increased 
steadily for another four years. Since 2003 SOCBs improved profit efficiency at a much 
faster speed and became in line with other banks in 2005. This pattern coincided with 
major SOCBs reforms—the first round of capital injection and NPLs off-loading in 
1999 and the restructuring of SOCBs since 2003 onwards.    
  
                                                 
7 The actual average performance of CCBs would be lower than our estimates. The sample includes only 
24 CCBs out of 112 for those data available for at least five years. Banks with better management and 
performance are more likely to make data publicly available. 
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 Figure 2 Mean cost efficiency by bank types (1995-2008) 
 
Notes: CCB = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, 
           SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. 
 
Figure 3 Mean profit efficiency by bank types (1995-2008) 
 
Notes: CCB = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, 
           SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. 
 
A puzzle has come to our attention that SOCBs are the most cost efficient banks but 
they are the most unprofitable banks. Our explanation to this puzzle is the huge amount 
of NPLs in SOCBs has an inflationary effect on cost efficiency. As detailed data on 
NPLs are not available in China, researchers have to include NPLs in total loans as an 
output. This inclusion inflates cost efficiency but not profit efficiency because no profits 
could be generated from NPLs. This effect also explains the pattern of cost efficiency 
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 movement shown in Figure 1.  Cost efficiency dropped slightly in 2000, which may be 
(partially) attributable to the transfer of NPLs of RMB 1.4 trillion from SOCBs in 1999. 
In the subsequent 7 years, cost efficiency crept along at an agonizingly slow pace 
totalling 5 percentage point increase while profit efficiency increased by 37 percentage 
points at a much faster pace. One possible explanation is that cost efficiency had 
increased but the increase was offset by the decreasing inflationary effects of NPLs. 
 
Moreover, ABC had the highest NPL ratio among SOCBs, which was almost six times 
that of ICBC and BOC, seven times that of CCBC in 2005.  The balance of ABC’s 
NPLs amounted to RMB 740 billion. Surprisingly the estimated mean cost efficiency is 
84% -- the highest among SOCBs. Apparently NPLs’ inflationary effect had significant 
influence here. Therefore we argue that cost efficiency estimates may be misleading and 
profit efficiency provides more accurate information at least in the case of China. The 
following analysis is mainly based on the results from the profit efficiency model while 
using the cost model as a complement.  For example, JSCBs are more profitable than 
SOCBs by 30 percentage points but less cost efficient by only 3 percentage points so we 
conclude that JSCBs outperform SOCBs.  
 
Listed banks ( 4 δ ) are not statistically more profitable than non-listed banks but they are 
more cost efficient. The selection effect indicators are used to examine the performance 
of banks subsequently being selected for IPOs or by foreign investors. The estimated 
coefficient on Selected for IPOs ( 5 δ ) shows no selection effect for IPOs while banks 
picked up by foreign investors ( 6 δ ) are more profitable (but less cost efficient).  
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 The dynamic effect indicators exams the impact of reforms on bank efficiency by 
comparing their performance before and after governance changes. Foreign ownership 
participation is found to have no impact on banks’ subsequent profitability in the short-
term ( 7 δ ) but a negative impact in the longer term ( 8 δ ). IPOs strategy is found to 
improve bank profitability in the short-term ( 9 δ ) but such gains tend to fade in the 
longer term ( 10 δ ). This may be because of the “window-dressing effect” before going 
public and therefore such gains may be unsustainable in the long-term. On the other 
hand, foreign ownership participation and IPOs improve cost efficiency in the long-term, 
implied by the negative and significant coefficients in the cost efficiency model. 
 
It seems that the main driving factor of efficiency improvement seems to be those one-
off bailout measures rather than IPOs and foreign acquisition strategies as expected. 
Future research should focus on controlling NPLs’ inflationary effect when estimating 
cost efficiency for more robust results. The year variable ( 11 δ ) in the inefficiency effect 
model captures temporal changes in inefficiency against the shifting frontier. Both cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency have improved as time passes. A healthy GDP growth 
( 12 δ ) offers a favourable macroeconomic condition which has a positive impact on 
profit efficiency but not on cost efficiency.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper examines cost and profit efficiency of 47 commercial banks in China for the 
period 1995-2008. There are two contributions to the existing literature on bank 
efficiency studies in China.  
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 First, the dataset is by far the largest and most comprehensive for the Chinese banking 
industry, covering all the major commercial banks before and after their IPOs, hence 
providing sufficient empirical evidence to test all the hypotheses presented at the 
beginning of the paper. In particular, we are to examine the ownership, selection and 
dynamic effects of governance changes on bank efficiency within the same analytical 
framework. Second, both the cost and profit efficiency models are used to compare the 
performance of different types of banks under different circumstances, allowing us to 
make more comprehensive and objective comparisons on the performance of different 
types of banks in different time periods. The use of market average input prices also 
improve the quality of our estimates therefore enhance the reliability of our findings. 
 
Bank efficiency has improved over the data period. Profit efficiency has improved at a 
faster rate than cost efficiency. Estimated industrial average profit efficiency and cost 
efficiency are 63 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively. The inclusion of NPLs in total 
loans inflates cost efficiency.  Hence, profit efficiency is a more appropriate 
performance measure over cost efficiency when banks have high level of NPLs.  
 
Ownership is found to influence efficiency significantly. CCBs are the most profitable 
banks, surpassing the most inefficient SOCBs by 40 percentage points. FBs are more 
profitable than major domestic banks of JSCBs and SOCBs, providing weak evidence 
for the global advantage hypothesis. SOCBs are the most inefficient banks.  Our results 
show a strong cherry picking effect that foreign investors have selected more profitable 
banks to take minority stakes.   
 
23 
 As for the dynamic effects of governance changes, foreign ownership participation 
appears to have increased profit inefficiency in the long run although they have initially 
picked up more profitable banks. This could be caused by investing activities and more 
prudential practices, such as more loan loss provision and investment in upgrading 
technology. These activities will sacrifice profitability at present or in the near future but 
will benefit the banks in the long run. The IPO strategy is found to improve profit 
efficiency in the short-term but gains tend to fade in the long-term. Short-term gains are 
largely attributable to one-off reform before going public rather than from expected 
good corporate governance. 
 
Although our results show the effect of foreign ownership and IPO strategies are not as 
effective as expected, they are essential successful steps in China’s long match to 
modernize its banking system. Chinese government has made considerable efforts on 
attracting foreign strategic investors for its major banks in the hope of foreign owners 
bringing in superior managerial skills and new technologies.  Banks have also been 
encouraged and actually pushed to go public to become competitive in a free market 
environment.  
 
The main purpose is to construct good corporate governance structure and improve bank 
performance. Given the fact that most foreign acquisition and IPOs took place after 
2004, it may need more time to realize their effect. Moreover, the upper limit of foreign 
ownership in domestic banks is still 25 per cent and that for a single foreign investor is 
20 per cent while the central government holds a majority controlling stake. It is 
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 doubtful whether foreign investors have sufficient power and ability to influence 
decision making processes in order to apply their operational and managerial skills.  
 
Furthermore, fundamental change in bank management and operations is a complex 
process. The decision-making process needs to be changed from policy-oriented to 
profit-driven. This also requires effective and enforceable steps to ensure corporate 
governance functioning in the long term and to prevent SOCBs from stepping back to 
their previous managerial and operational behaviours. Policy makers should be aware of 
the possibility that reform outcomes may depart from the initiative purposes. Bank 
performance should be closely monitored and any adverse signs should be followed up 
to ensure banking reform is still on track.   
 
Partial privatization and government intervention might hinder and postpone the success 
of reforms. The Chinese government has partially privatized SOCBs but still retains a 
controlling stake that facilitates government intervention in SOCBs’ operations. 
Existing information and evidence suggest that government intervention still persists 
and whether it could be reversed in the near future is uncertain. The key to bank reform 
success is fundamental shifts in banks’ management and operations away from a policy 
orientation. This is unlikely to happen as long as the government has an incentive and 
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